Ralph Norman Haber and Lyn Haber, Partners
 313 Ridge View Drive, Swall Meadows, California 93514
Telephone 760-387-2458; Fax 760-387-2459; E-Mail ralph@humanfactorsconsultants.com
Website: www.humanfactorsconsultants.com

Recent Research Publications

Abstracts of seven of our recent research papers on eyewitness testimony, memory, fingerprint identifications, and human factors issues are included here. Several of the complete papers can be read and/or downloaded by CLICKING on the title.

• Experiencing, Remembering and Reporting Events: The cognitive psychology of eyewitness testimony, by Ralph N. Haber and Lyn Haber. Psychology, Public Policy and Law, 2000, vol. 6, pp. 1057-1097.
  

Abstract: Human beings frequently describe from memory events they have observed, and most people consider these descriptions to be accurate. However, scientific research on memory in the last few decades has revealed that people's memories are often inaccurate. These errors in memory are systematic and are especially likely to occur for the kinds of events that are reported in courtroom testimony: reports of strangers performing brief, violent or unexpected acts that are frightening to the observer/witness. This article examines the research on factors that affect the accuracy of initial observation, encoding and remembering and forgetting such events. The authors consider the special memory issues involved in describing and identifying strangers, and how these can impair the accuracy of eyewitness identifications. Throughout the review of the research findings, the authors consider their impact on courtroom procedures governing eyewitness testimony and identification. The article concludes with a set of policy recommendations based on this scientific evidence.

• Criteria for Judging the Admissibility of Eyewitness Testimony of Long Past Events, by Lyn Haber and Ralph N. Haber. Psychology, Public Policy and Law, 1998, Vol. 4, pp. 1135-1159.
  

Abstract: Court cases of recovered memories of childhood abuse, in which the victim's testimony may constitute the only evidence available, and a growing body of research demonstrating the inexactitude and suggestibility of autobiographical memory of long past events, are forcing courts and cognitive scientists to seek scientific, principled criteria for admissibility of such testimony. The authors use as examples two recent court cases. In the first case, a concussion produced total retrograde amnesia for an accident for a period of three years, and then, over a few months, the driver claimed his memory returned. In the second, two adults reported to the police that they witnessed their sister's murder 35 years earlier, when they were three and five years old, respectively. The authors provide objective guidelines for courts to determine whether testimony about recovered or very long term memory for eyewitnessed events should be admissible. The principles we outline easily can be expanded to include eyewitness testimony in general.

• Eyewitness Testimony about Traffic Accidents, by Ralph N. Haber and Lyn Haber. In Human Factors in Automobile Accident Reconstruction, 2003 (Ch. 21, pp. 663-696), edited by Robert Dewar andPaul Olson, published by Lawyers and Judges Publishers, Tucson, Arizona.
  

Abstract: Scientific research on memory in the last few decades has revealed that people's memories are often inaccurate. Their errors in memory are systematic and include inaccurate reports of where people and objects were, the sequence in which the event occurred, and the identification of people or objects involved. These errors are especially likely to occur for events that are sudden, brief, violent, and often frightening to the observer-witness; precisely for the kinds of events witnesses have to describe in courtroom testimony. We examine the research on factors that affect the accuracy of initial observation, encoding and remembering such events, focusing on the observation of automobile accidents.

• Eyewitness Accuracy When Making an Identification in a Lineup, by Ralph N. Haber and Lyn Haber. Unpublished 2004 version available. Submitted for publication, 2004.
  

Abstract: Cognitive scientists have conducted hundreds of experiments on the factors that affect subject-eyewitness identification accuracy from lineup presentations. However, these laboratory results have not been analyzed to show the overall accuracy of subject-witnesses in their identifications, nor have the accuracy levels found in these laboratory results been used to estimate the accuracy levels of real (non-experimental) eyewitnesses making identifications from lineups constructed and administered by the police. To supply this evidence, we selected every recently published experiment (N = 48) in which subject-eyewitnesses observed a crime and attempted to identify the perpetrator from a lineup, and in which the results were or could be scored in terms of hits, false alarms, misses and correct rejects. When the perpetrator is present in the lineup, across all of the experiments, 51% of the witnesses correctly identify the perpetrator, with the remainder divided evenly between false alarms and misses. When the perpetrator is absent from the lineup, 43% of the witnesses correctly report that none of the persons is the perpetrator; the remaining 57% make erroneous identifications. These and additional results (concerning experimental difficulty of observation and recall conditions, sampling, and artifacts) are shown to be consistent with a wider body of other laboratory research on the accuracy with which subject-witnesses can identify strangers. Analysis of the differences between experimental and real life conditions, of experimental results in non-crime settings, and of converging evidence from studies carried out in the field and from police records all suggest that the "50%" accuracy rate can be generalized to the accuracy levels of real life eyewitnesses who identify the perpetrator from a police lineup.

• Error Rates for Human Latent Fingerprint Examiners, by Lyn Haber and Ralph N. Haber, 2004. In Advances in Automatic Fingerprint Recognition (Ch. 17, pp. 337-358), edited by Nalini Ratha and R. Bolle, published by Springer-Verlag Publishers, New York.
  

Abstract: Fingerprint comparison evidence has been used in criminal courts for almost 100 years to identify defendants as perpetrators of crimes. Until very recently, this evidence has been accepted by the courts as infallibly accurate. We review four kinds of available data about the accuracy of fingerprint comparisons made by human latent fingerprint examiners: anecdotal FBI data; published data on the accuracy of consensus fingerprint comparisons made by groups of examiners working in crime laboratories; the proficiency and certification test scores of latent fingerprint examiners tested individually; and the results of controlled experiments on the accuracy of fingerprint comparisons. We conclude that anecdotal data are useless and misleading; consensus judgments of fingerprint comparisons show either indeterminant or quite large error rates; the proficiency and certification procedures in current use lack validity and cannot serve to specify the accuracy or skill level of individual fingerprint examiners; and there is no published research evidence on error rates. It is impossible to determine from existing data whether true error rates are miniscule or substantial.

• Estimating Erroneous Identification Rates for Fingerprint Comparisons Presented in Court, by Lyn Haber and Ralph N. Haber. Submitted for publication 2004. Draft available.
  

Abstract: The past decade has seen both a growing number of challenges in court to identifications based on fingerprint comparisons and a growing number of documented erroneous identifications. However, the probability that an identification presented in court may be erroneous has not been systematically assessed. We describe four kinds of data to estimate error rates of fingerprint examiners when they testify in court to an identification: documented instances of erroneous identifications made in court; the proficiency and certification test scores of examiners tested individually; the test scores of crime laboratories when examiners may have worked together; and experimental results on the accuracy of fingerprint comparisons. Where possible, we use these data to estimate minimum boundaries to erroneous identification rates. We conclude that the minimum erroneous identification rate in court testimony must be above two percent. The upper boundary cannot be estimated, because none of these data reflect the true difficulty of the comparison task performed by examiners.

• Human Factors Expertise in Safety Litigation, by Lyn Haber and Ralph N. Haber. Unpublished. The 2001 draft version available.
  

Abstract: We present a formalized structure for a human factors expert witness to follow in presenting testimony in the course of civil litigation related to safety. Our goal is that every human factors specialist, relying on the same body of scientific knowledge, analyzing the same evidence, and following this organization of content, should be able to reach the same conclusion. We suggest a seven step process, each based on the science of human factors. First, in the context of an accident/injury, what was the dangerous condition? Second, what could the plaintiff have done to remove the danger or reduce the severity of the accident? Third, what could the defendant have done to remove the danger or reduce the severity of the accident? Fourth, what did the plaintiff do and not do? Fifth, what did the defendant do and not do? Sixth, based on our analysis of the danger, potential ways it could have been avoided or mitigated, and the actual actions taken, what are our opinions as to the factors that caused the accident. Seventh, what are our opinions regarding any conflicting testimony, evidence, or argument from opposing counsel. This structure provides a clear, science-based, chain of reasoned logic from description of accident to the expert opinion proffered as to the contributing factors of the cause of the accident: a sequence helpful to judge and jury alike. To illustrate, we apply these seven steps to five actual cases.