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Ralph Norman Haber and Lyn Haber, Partners |
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Recent Research PublicationsAbstracts of some of our recent research papers on eyewitness testimony, memory, fingerprint identifications, and human factors issues are included here. Several of the complete papers can be read and/or downloaded by CLICKING on the title.
Abstract: When a scientific method is used by an expert to reach a conclusion offered in court, the Frye ruling in 1923 and particularly the Daubert ruling in 1993 requires that the method itself has been shown to be valid. When applied to fingerprint methods, valid means accurately distinguishing between pairs of prints made by one and by two donors. Courts have ruled uniformly in more than 40 Daubert hearings since 1999 that fingerprint evidence rests on a valid method, referred to as the Analysis-Comparison-Evaluation-Verification (ACE-V) method. In this article, we discuss the scientific evidence needed to document the validity of ACE-V. We describe examples of experiments that would provide this evidence, and review the available published research. We briefly describe the testimony presented by fingerprint examiners in these hearings, intended to show that ACE-V meets the Daubert criteria for validity. We analyze evidence for the validity of the standards underlying the conclusions made by fingerprint examiners. We conclude that the kinds of experiments that would establish the validity of ACE-V and the standards on which conclusions are based have not been performed. These experiments require a number of prerequisites, which also have yet to be met, so that the ACE-V method currently is both untested and untestable. Abstract: Eyewitnesses in real life make erroneous identifications, as shown by compilations of a century's worth of newspaper accounts of erroneous indictments and/or convictions based on mistaken eyewitnesses, and based on published descriptions of exonerations since 1989 that show that the majority of the erroneous convictions resulted from erroneous eyewitness identifications. These accounts do not indicate an error rate, only a high number of instances. To estimate error rates with which eyewitnesses identify innocent suspects in police lineups and innocent defendants in court, we review and evaluate five independent lines of research. These include: (1) laboratory experimental research on face recognition showing the accuracy of recognizing unfamiliar faces seen just once before, in the absence of a crime; (2) laboratory experimental research from 1970 to the present in which subjects observe a crime and attempt an identification from a lineup; (3) field research studies from the showing the accuracy of the identification of a "perpetrator," in the absence of a crime; (4) military laboratory research data showing the accuracy with which soldiers can identify their interrogators (perpetrators) from a lineup 24 hours after intense and stressful questioning; and (5) analyses of police archival data showing the percentage of time that an eyewitness picks the person the police have placed in the lineup as the suspect. These data bases, taken together, establish an upper limit on eyewitness identification accuracy of less than 50% correct (correct identification rate and/or correct rejection of the lineup when the perpetrator is not in the lineup). They further indicate that most real eyewitnesses to real crimes are unable to achieve even this modest level of accuracy when they testify in court to an identification of a defendant as the perpetrator. Abstract: Human beings frequently describe from memory events they have observed, and most people consider these descriptions to be accurate. However, scientific research on memory in the last few decades has revealed that people's memories are often inaccurate. These errors in memory are systematic and are especially likely to occur for the kinds of events that are reported in courtroom testimony: reports of strangers performing brief, violent or unexpected acts that are frightening to the observer/witness. This article examines the research on factors that affect the accuracy of initial observation, encoding and remembering and forgetting such events. The authors consider the special memory issues involved in describing and identifying strangers, and how these can impair the accuracy of eyewitness identifications. Throughout the review of the research findings, the authors consider their impact on courtroom procedures governing eyewitness testimony and identification. The article concludes with a set of policy recommendations based on this scientific evidence. Abstract: Court cases of recovered memories of childhood abuse, in which the victim's testimony may constitute the only evidence available, and a growing body of research demonstrating the inexactitude and suggestibility of autobiographical memory of long past events, are forcing courts and cognitive scientists to seek scientific, principled criteria for admissibility of such testimony. The authors use as examples two recent court cases. In the first case, a concussion produced total retrograde amnesia for an accident for a period of three years, and then, over a few months, the driver claimed his memory returned. In the second, two adults reported to the police that they witnessed their sister's murder 35 years earlier, when they were three and five years old, respectively. The authors provide objective guidelines for courts to determine whether testimony about recovered or very long term memory for eyewitnessed events should be admissible. The principles we outline easily can be expanded to include eyewitness testimony in general. Abstract: Fingerprint comparison evidence has been used in criminal courts for almost 100 years to identify defendants as perpetrators of crimes. Until very recently, this evidence has been accepted by the courts as infallibly accurate. We review four kinds of available data about the accuracy of fingerprint comparisons made by human latent fingerprint examiners: anecdotal FBI data; published data on the accuracy of consensus fingerprint comparisons made by groups of examiners working in crime laboratories; the proficiency and certification test scores of latent fingerprint examiners tested individually; and the results of controlled experiments on the accuracy of fingerprint comparisons. We conclude that anecdotal data are useless and misleading; consensus judgments of fingerprint comparisons show either indeterminant or quite large error rates; the proficiency and certification procedures in current use lack validity and cannot serve to specify the accuracy or skill level of individual fingerprint examiners; and there is no published research evidence on error rates. It is impossible to determine from existing data whether true error rates are miniscule or substantial. Abstract: We present a formalized structure for a human factors expert witness to follow in presenting testimony in the course of civil litigation related to safety. Our goal is that every human factors specialist, relying on the same body of scientific knowledge, analyzing the same evidence, and following this organization of content, should be able to reach the same conclusion. We suggest a seven step process, each based on the science of human factors. First, in the context of an accident/injury, what was the dangerous condition? Second, what could the plaintiff have done to remove the danger or reduce the severity of the accident? Third, what could the defendant have done to remove the danger or reduce the severity of the accident? Fourth, what did the plaintiff do and not do? Fifth, what did the defendant do and not do? Sixth, based on our analysis of the danger, potential ways it could have been avoided or mitigated, and the actual actions taken, what are our opinions as to the factors that caused the accident. Seventh, what are our opinions regarding any conflicting testimony, evidence, or argument from opposing counsel. This structure provides a clear, science-based, chain of reasoned logic from description of accident to the expert opinion proffered as to the contributing factors of the cause of the accident: a sequence helpful to judge and jury alike. To illustrate, we apply these seven steps to five actual cases. |
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